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Why don't we talk about accidents?

We have, and we do! We just don't have a specific area - maybe we need it?

sj
 
After some thought, it also has to do with the fact that a lot of the things that happen here don't get on an NTSB report, as often there is no airport involved.

sj
 
We have, and we do! We just don't have a specific area - maybe we need it?

sj
i think it would be a great idea, learning from mistakes is how aviation becomes safer, not learning will only lead to a re pete of a bad event. Not just the major's even the minors in hopes of preventing a major.
 
I think one of the rules is to wait until the "final" NTSB report is in. Otherwise your just speculating out of ignorance. For instance the current accident, we have no idea the cause. The pilot could have died at 14,000 feet and made no mistakes. I wouldn't even rate that cause as related to aviation. I read the preliminary report and of course internally came to some conclusion of the most likely cause but I certainly wouldn't give voice to it. No one knows the cause before the authorities are done and then we will be left with "what it wasn't" most likely, not what it was. THEN we can speculate more directly but remember this was a good and careful pilot so the discussion will have to factor that in which is probably very uncomfortable for some who believe they are past that. I do believe the discussion will be valuable but not yet.
 
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I have seen many Brothers-in Arms buy the farm in my career.. I have a personal rule to avoid any theories regarding crashes for at least a week until the dust settles and the talking heads lose interest. In this case, we will never know what was in the man's mind or how it really went down.

Life goes on and hopefully something good comes of it. By that I mean it keeps another soul from harm.

Eddie
 
If we had a place to post accidents or even near accidents I think it would be a good thing. It could be a little like the NASA forms, we can be big enough to admit mistakes and things that have happened for all of us to learn from. The hope is that no matter how minor our accident, mistake or just poor a poor choice is, maybe someone could learn from it and that makes the entire community a better place and a safer place. We all make mistakes and we all have made poor decisions in the airplanes we fly, most of the time the poor decisions we make we get away with. It is horrible when an accident happens especially if it involves a loss of life, be it a poor decision or an equipment failure it really doesn't matter. What does matter is what can be learned from it to maybe save another life another day.

Just my thoughts....

Dan
 
Perhaps we need a "Confessional" thread with a veil as with Medical Matters, it would certainly be better a learning and cleansing tool than the typical "Cone of Silence."
 
I would think this would need to be a member's area (log in to view, not just scrape up off an internet search) type of area. There could be a "flip flop" section of the members area.

I have sent out over 250 flip flop hats since I established them, probably longer ago than I can remember. The goal of that was to encourage people to save others by sharing their story - even if just on a one on one basis. Most of these "events" never saw the light of day anywhere else. The good news is that I sent out fewer this year than in the past, but maybe people are forgetting to send me that little email that says "so and so needs a hat"...

sj
 
I remember discussing this very topic and the ability to remain anonymous. Wasn't there a forum put in place for that at one time? Not that I have anything to contribute. 8)
 
I remember discussing this very topic and the ability to remain anonymous. Wasn't there a forum put in place for that at one time? Not that I have anything to contribute. 8)

At the time, I could not purchase enough storage for your confessions... :)

But seriously, it has been discussed and certainly something we can try.

BTW, several people have mentioned "Beechtalk". It is a super active and really well run forum. I hope to learn more from it!

sj
 
Not to bore you with medicine, but one of the things we found to be instructive in academic medicine is what we call "M&M Conference"...Morbidity and Mortality. Depending upon the academic institution a resident physician gathered the facts of a case, organized them and presented the chain of events to the audience (which was composed of attending physicians, resident physicians and anyone who wanted to learn from others mistakes/adverse outcomes. No one enjoys having their dirty laundry aired, but the benefit was great for those who attended and who had an open mind.

This would work really well here, I think, as some of you have pointed out.

Randy
 
I can tell you about my large bush/small tree trimming prowess!

I am working on an STC for chainsaws on the wing leading edge.
 
Discussing accidents that don't involve fatalities generally isn't difficult, but when fatalities are involved, sensitivities tend to be fairly raw and easily irritated.

In 47 years of flying, I've known a number of folks who were killed in airplane accidents, some of those folks I considered to be good friends. In almost every one of those cases, I heard speculation on what happened, almost always assigning pilot error as the causative factor of the accident. In cases where fatalities are involved, this sort of speculation can and often does cause even more grief for loved ones and friends.

Perhaps as bad is that such speculation can sometimes feed the litigation machine, and none of us wants to go there.

Also, I've seen at least two accidents with fatalities in which the NTSB missed some key information, and came to completely inaccurate conclusions. So, an NTSB report, at least on a GA accident, may or may not offer the correct answers.

Frankly, it is indeed a rare accident which wasn't largely the result of pilot error, and I think most pilots realize that. While our discussions may seem reasonable and an effort to learn so that we can avoid a similar fate, it's important that not everyone reading these forums is a pilot.

Please keep this in mind in these discussions. My dear friend Tom Wardlegh told me once that if you ever talk about a fatal aircraft accident in a roomful of people, there will be someone in that group who knew someone killed in that accident, so be very careful what you say and how it's presented. A couple weeks later, I went to an FAA safety seminar and a FSDO Inspector got up and discussed a recent fatal accident. The audience response was not positive, and nobody learned much there.

MTV
 
During my last flight review the instructor and I went over parts of this FAA publication: https://www.faa.gov/regulations_pol...viation/media/risk_management_hb_change_1.pdf

I'm not one to ignore change and while news to me I found it worthwhile...the instructor came from 135/121 ops and this was a familiar topic...but I had no previous recent training to any extent in the concepts.

He also mentioned the perception of risk factors as discussed in the publication could be taught to some extent, but the tolerance level of risk not as easily as it's an individual trait...risk prone vs risk adverse people.

Those that instruct probably know about this more than some of the rest of us.

GAP
 
My dear friend Tom Wardlegh told me once that if you ever talk about a fatal aircraft accident in a roomful of people, there will be someone in that group who knew someone killed in that accident, so be very careful what you say and how it's presented. A couple weeks later, I went to an FAA safety seminar and a FSDO Inspector got up and discussed a recent fatal accident. The audience response was not positive, and nobody learned much there.

Sage advice. Tom Wardleigh was my flight instructor when I got my PPL, and I often reflect on much of his shared wisdom when I'm flying. Thanks for sharing that.
 
Tom would be the first to point out where he screwed up. When we screw up there are ramifications, trying to minimize those ramifications is why we discuss accidents. Waiting for an NTSB report is a waste of time, they rarely get it right. Just remember you owe the folks back home a 180 degree turn when things don't look right. Nothing wrong with trying it another day...
 
I can tell you about my large bush/small tree trimming prowess!

I am working on an STC for chainsaws on the wing leading edge.

i have special skills & tools for removing dents, from other members wings when they have tried this.... actually it was tops of BIG trees..
 
.. in which the NTSB missed some key information, and came to completely inaccurate conclusions. So, an NTSB report, at least on a GA accident, may or may not offer the correct answers...
MTV

absolutely!! they are a joke most of the time...
 
With respect to the Pilatus accident that inspired this thread..... I'd like to know why the pilot climbed to 14,000+ feet and then descended to 8,000' in the middle of rugged mountains. It doesn't make sense. For those unfamiliar with the area, 14K is higher than necessary to go over the top and 8K isn't high enough. And why try it when the low route was socked in? I'd also like to know how the Air Guard knows the flight profile. Obviously they were weathered out but it appears they had a track on the plane. I'm curious whether that track was facilitated by the plane's equipment or military equipment. And I know they aren't going to share their secrets. My curiosity about the events that led to the accident are not intended to be disrespectful of the pilot or his survivors. I'd just like to make sense of the information the Air Guard and NTSB have provided to the public. I've lost close friends in accidents they piloted themselves into. I think about those accidents often. Not to assess blame. I wasn't in the cockpit and can't know what string of events led to the accidents, but I do have an interest in the whats and whys so I might avoid the same ones. Icing? Equipment failure? Pilot incapacitation? I think my friends would support this thought process given the chance.
 
Stewart,

went to 14 K then descended.....did he have oxygen? maybe the tops were higher further west and he saw a "hole" which looked good. I've done that and wished I hadn't, but was fortunate to survive it. As to data, I doubt there's anything very sophisticated there...maybe ADS-B if he was high enough.

It it sounds as if from the information provided that he was trying all avenues to get to Lake Clark, where he'd been the day before. Maybe the day before he'd been able to wind his way there, but the day of the accident the weather was a little worse. We'll likely never know. The possibilities are almostvendless.

MTV
 
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There are many dif radar types working an area, civilian & military. There may even be airborne radar looking at you. Web based systems like Spidertracks can also be used if onboard. The NTSB would have access to these. There was an accident on the North Slope years ago, the closest Air Force Dew Line Site radar plotted the track of the aircraft to impact.
 
This Pilatus accident has been troubling me. Yet I've been reluctant to mention my feelings in public for fear of ruffling some feathers. I have a good friend who owned a Turbo Porter and have had the opportunity to fly it both on wheels and on amphib floats. Frankly the Porter is a Super Cub on steroids. I've also flown extensively in the same area where the accident took place. Twenty five plus years ago I used to spend my vacations flying my turbo charged 185 on amphib floats to Alaska and during that time made many trips through Merrill pass. On one beautiful CAVU day my wife and I decided to go to Lake Illiamna for a picnic. We departed from Birchwood, flew through Merrill to Pedro Bay on Illiamna. We had a wonderful time before returning to Birchwood via the same route. As we were entering Merrill it became obvious that the pass was closed, so we turned around. After passing Two Lakes I decided to climb enough to fly over the mountains fully expecting to go IFR if necessary. Upon climbing above 7000 feet still below the clouds it started to snow, in August. As you locals know at 3,500 feet going through Merrill, you will be walking. At the time I was very proficient in IFR flying as I was a professional pilot doing that very thing daily. Knowing that snow/ice was not conducive to long life in a 185 amphib over the mountains even though it had a turbo, we turned around and headed for Lake Clark pass. While east bound in that pass we came upon a wall of snow just before the pass made a right turn out of the mountains. Turn around again. This time we landed in Portage Lake just to the north side of the pass. We started this day with a full load of 103 gallons of gas, needless to say at this point there was not a lot left on board. After finding fresh bear tracks on the shore, we elected to sleep in the plane, for two nights. The next day the clouds were covering the bottoms of the hills, yet we thought that we could hear an occasional plane flying through the pass. We didn't have enough fuel to go look. The third day the sun came out. We headed out to Kenai for fuel where I refused the tower's instructions to go around in order to let a Twin Otter land ahead of me. Needless to say we had to have a phone conversation. We had ten gallons remaining in the tanks with the needles pegged on E in an airplane whose fuel consumption was 17.5 gallons per hour. The turbo is gone now.

How does this story relate to the Porter accident? The location where we turned around at 7000 feet was about the same area where the Porter crashed. The weather makes up it's own mind of what to do in these mountains. At times I've flown over Merrill pass due to low clouds and found holes in which the ground was recognizable enough to let down through. I never knew the pilot of this Porter though I suspect that he was flying over the mountains when he encountered some clouds convincing him to climb over the top thereby the 14,000 foot observation. Prior to clearing the other side he likely found a hole with recognizable terrain so let down in order to avoid flying IFR. Maybe he did have an instrument rating which he practically never used so felt uncomfortable flying in the clouds? Perhaps it was snowing with ice forming so he wanted out? We'll likely never know. It will be all speculation.

Lesson for all, no matter who you are nor how much experience you may have, when flying over mountains with the clouds forming and you are not very comfortable flying IFR, TURN AROUND if you can't land. Go back so that you can try again another day.

Long long ago I watched a fellow taxing his Swift in soft ground when it stopped. He applied a lot of power, the plane promptly tipped on it's nose. I helped pull the tail back down. LESSON, pay attention to what other people do when they get in trouble. Do not do the same thing yourself. Many years after this incident my wife and I were attending a Swift fly-in in Florida when a Swift was taxing across some soft ground where it came to a stop. The pilot started to apply power so I mentioned to my wife that he was about to tip on his nose. He did! LEARN FROM OTHER PEOPLES MISTAKES. Tell your fellow pilots what you have learned. Perhaps you can prevent just one incident. Then it will be worthwhile.

Yes SJ a thread for accident analysis could be very productive if the members will approach it with open minds.
 
Kudos for 406 ELTs. You guys who think 121.5s or PLBs are good enough? Think again.

Agreed, but Stewart, as noted in past discussions about 406 beacons, it MAY take some time to derive an accurate location of an alerting device.
Orders of magnitude better devices than the old 121.5 beacons, but a GPS connection can make the 406 even better.

MTV
 
I have been thinking about the response to this thread for several days now. The reason is I am not sure anything beneficial will come of it. Why? I can point to two threads. One regarding the Asiana crash at SFO and the other multiple threads regarding mid air collisions.

Unless members are willing to admit that no one takes to the air thinking their practice of aviation will result in a crash with the exception of a suicide nothing good can be ascertained. The old, "Yep he messed up" is not enough to make an accident thread valuable. Sure there is the basics, such as in the Asiana crash, why three good pilots let the airplane stall. However what were the events, the scenario and limits that led to that event. How can that scenario be broken? What were the internal and external factors that led to such a distraction? Every pilot knows you need airspeed and these pilots were no exception, however in the thread discussion very few had ever flown the Bridge visual into SFO and even fewer were willing to understand the complexity and external factors would effect a pilot to the point he would lose track of such a basic precept. Yet believe it or not, LOC i.e stalling the aircraft is the number one cause of crashes in air carrier operations, outstripping CFIT now. So simply saying 'don't stall" is not enough. It goes to the recognition of potential sequence of events that would cause LOC.

Equally so, the threads on mid air collisions. We have actually had pilots here say they know they see all the traffic because their "heads are on a swivel". Really, how do you know a fact that you don't know? Just this Tuesday, the NTSB once again highlighted in two accidents the limitations, both physical with the aircraft involved and physiological limitations of see and avoid. To put it another way, past best practices in the face of overwhelming evidence of failure of those practices requires a rethink that some people appear to be incapable of doing.

For these reasons I am skeptical of the value of such threads unless there is a willingness to honestly assess all factors, question all practices and assumptions and not just pinning it upon the pilot messing and saying you will not because you........
 
GeeBee, I believe you are referring to the two mid-airs that they recently completed, being the 150/F-16 and the Sabreliner/172. As I understand the report, the crux was to prevail upon pilots to use every available means at there disposable to better inform them while flying, and in this case in reference to see/avoid scenarios. And while I have an opinion on those, as you said, we as pilots have to be willing to access all factors. Perhaps I'm the naive one, but if one person gets a better comprehension of a scenario that contributes to one flight saving lives, I'm will to take the risk of a good discussion.

This following statement is perhaps for another thread, but I'll throw it out here anyhow, as a friend of mine recently stated. And this is not finger pointing, this is a reminder.
As long as human beings are involved there will always be human factors.


I went to training last year at the NTSB where all we looked at were accidents where ATC was a primary in the probable cause and it was VERY enlightening. Kind of like what the NTSB put out yesterday....use everything you have in the airplane, including your gut instinct. In training we listened to tapes of several professional pilots questioning ATC about a clearance right before they follwed the ATC instructions and flew into the ground.

pb.
 
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