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Oops, darn it...

I keep hearing about Cirrus being 'fast', and the speed makes it just so hard to land or slow down...

People act like there has never been other planes that cruised in the 150+ knot range before. As if the Bonanza never existed.

Other planes, like the Mooney, were very quick, and really fast if you pumped fuel through them in mass quantities... what makes the Cirrus such a enigma as to flight principals?
 
The best part about the Bonanza and Mooney arrivals are that they don’t take long once 197 guys can agree that their planes will still fly under 1200’ overcast.

I’m guessing theres not a Super Cub mass arrival mainly because it would take 2 hrs to get 12 planes in…..In the first flight you’d have three guys told to land long that would then have a slow flight competition over 8,000ft of runway. Following them would be two guys landing on each side of the runway trying to save their bushwheels while the lead try’s to land in the dot and then waits for a distance measurement. I’m sure the third flight would be a mix of three point and wheel landers that would land on the numbers and then taxi 3,000ft with their tails up smoking brakes while the three pointer S turns for 15 min before turning into the grass. The last flight would be a mix with one breaking off to land at the ultralight strip and the other two landing short of the runway because it’s a shorter taxi to the quiet camping spots;-)
 
The best part about the Bonanza and Mooney arrivals are that they don’t take long once 197 guys can agree that their planes will still fly under 1200’ overcast.

I’m guessing theres not a Super Cub mass arrival mainly because it would take 2 hrs to get 12 planes in…..In the first flight you’d have three guys told to land long that would then have a slow flight competition over 8,000ft of runway. Following them would be two guys landing on each side of the runway trying to save their bushwheels while the lead try’s to land in the dot and then waits for a distance measurement. I’m sure the third flight would be a mix of three point and wheel landers that would land on the numbers and then taxi 3,000ft with their tails up smoking brakes while the three pointer S turns for 15 min before turning into the grass. The last flight would be a mix with one breaking off to land at the ultralight strip and the other two landing short of the runway because it’s a shorter taxi to the quiet camping spots;-)

Actually there was a J-3 arrival a few years ago. Bonanzas have been around long enough that there is a decent training program. No training, insurance is hard to come by. The Bonanza arrivals always go very well....trained and disciplined leaders, and most of these folks today know how to fly them.

MTV
 
It is the 6th Grp of the Cubs that gets scary, they discover no one in front of them paid attention and did stop for a measurement and now these guys were committed and now need to do touch and go on the wings of everyone else in front of them.

The Mooney Caravan also requires a yearly refresher to join in.
 
I remember being at Oshkosh when Roscoe Brown was the announcer and he introduced the mass Bonanza group on final. After about half of them landed he announced " what in the world are we going to do with all these gynecologist"

Glenn
 
If I recall that was 1990. after 91 I took a multi year break while I went back to racing.
 
Trim tabs installed upside down _and_ backwards.


- NTSB Issue preliminary report into the fatal accident involving a Piper PA-31P-425 Pressurized Navajo, N575BC, that occurred on May 21st, 2021, near Myrtle Beach International Airport (MYR/KMYR), Horry County, South Carolina:

On May 21, 2021, at 1814 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-31P, N575BC, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. The airline transport pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The flight was the airplane’s first flight after maintenance was performed and prior to the flight, the airplane was fueled with 167.5 gallons of 100 low lead aviation fuel.

The airplane departed Myrtle Beach International Airport (MYR), Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, at 1812 with the intended destination of Grand Strand Airport (CRE), North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. According to preliminary ADS-B and air traffic control radio communications data, prior to takeoff the pilot established communications and reported that he was ready for departure from runway 18. He was instructed to fly runway heading, climb to 1,700 ft, and was cleared for takeoff. Once airborne, the controller instructed the pilot to turn left; however, the pilot stated that he needed to return to runway 18. The controller instructed the pilot to enter a right closed traffic pattern at 1,500 ft. As the airplane continued to turn to the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, it reached an altitude of about 1,000 ft mean sea level (msl). While on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, the airplane descended to 450 ft msl, climbed to 700 ft msl, and then again descended to 475 ft msl prior to the loss of radar contact. About 1 minute after the pilot requested to return to the runway, the controller asked if any assistance was required, to which the pilot replied, “yes, we’re in trouble.” There were no further radio communications from the pilot.

The airplane impacted in a field about .1 mile beyond the last radar return, at an elevation of 20 ft. A postimpact fire ensued, and the debris field was about 400 ft long by 150 ft wide. All major components of the airplane were located in the vicinity of the main wreckage. Each engine came to rest in about a 5 ft crater and remained attached to the fuselage.

The left engine crankcase was impact damaged in multiple locations. The gearbox was impact separated. All valve covers remained intact and attached to the cylinders. The valve covers were removed an no anomalies were noted. Crankshaft and camshaft continuity were confirmed by using a lighted borescope to examine the internal components of the engine. In addition, the cylinders were examined using a lighted borescope and no anomalies were noted. All engine accessories were impact separated and fragmented. The left engine turbocharger was impact separated, would bind when it rotated, and scoring was noted on the casing.

The right engine crankcase was impact damaged in multiple locations. All valve covers remained intact and attached to the cylinders. The valve covers were removed an no anomalies were noted. Crankshaft and camshaft continuity were confirmed by using a lighted borescope to examine the internal components of the engine. In addition, the cylinders were examined using a lighted borescope and no anomalies were noted. All engine accessories were impact separated and fragmented. The oil suction screen was removed was not occluded. The right engine turbocharger was impact separated and would bind when it rotated.

The left propeller was impact separated from the engine. Two of the three blades were separated from the hub. All blades exhibited polishing. One blade was bent forward, one exhibited tip curling, and the last blade was bent aft. The blade that was bent aft remained attached to the propeller hub.

The right propeller was impact separated from the right engine. Two of the three blades were impact separated from the hub. All blades exhibited polishing. One blade was bent forward, one blade was bent aft, and one blade remained straight. The straight blade remained attached to the propeller hub.

Flight control cable continuity was established from all flight control surfaces to the cockpit through multiple overload breaks in the cables. A majority of the wings and fuselage were consumed by fire. The remaining skin and structure exhibited accordion-like impact damage that was symmetrical on both wings. The landing gear was in the extended position. The flaps were in the retracted position. The empennage was separated from the fuselage and located about 50 ft from the main wreckage. The top section of the vertical stabilizer and the rudder were impact crushed downward. The elevator remained attached to the right horizontal stabilizer. The right trim tab remained attached to the right elevator, was deflected up, but was impact separated from the connecting rod. The left trim tab remained attached to the left elevator, the connecting rod remained attached to the flight controls, and it was deflected up.

Further examination of the elevator trim tabs revealed that they were installed upside-down and reversed. The connecting rod that attached the trim tab to the trim drum that should be located on the top of the trim tab was located on the bottom side.

The airplane’s most recent annual inspection was completed on May 19, 2021. Maintenance performed at that time included removing, repainting, and reinstalling the primary and secondary flight control surfaces.

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: Piper
Registration: N575BC
Model/Series: PA-31P
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built: No
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Operator Designator Code:

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: VMC
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: MYR,25 ft msl
Observation Time: 17:56 Local
Distance from Accident Site: 2 Nautical Miles
Temperature/Dew Point: 24°C /18°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 10 knots / , 110°
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility: 10 miles
Altimeter Setting: 30.4 inches Hg
Type of Flight Plan Filed:
Departure Point: Myrtle Beach, SC (MYR)
Destination: North Myrtle Beach, SC (CRE)

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Fire: On-ground
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 1 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude: 33.685597,-78.968609

- Photo: not from the report, via GERARD ALBERT GALBERT@THESUNNEWS.COM


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I wrote a section in our company manual on picking an aircraft up from maintenance, and a separate section on conducting maintenance functional test flights. While I wouldn’t expect an individual operator to have a written procedure, the premise would be the same. We would sit in a conference room with the flight crew, maintenance lead from the facility and our company maintenance technician. We would review each item that was accomplished from the work order, and note if anything special was required particular to that item. For example if a flight control was removed, we would note that a functional check of that surface and a check mark from us was required prior to flight. For heavy maintenance the entire procedure could take the better part of a day. It would drive some of the facility management mad, but well worth it and ultimately helped protect them as well. People can and do screw up. I was always amazed to see a crew show up, jump in an airplane and depart from a maintenance facility with little more than a cursory walk-around. We came up with the need for this after we picked up an aircraft from a well known and respected facility only to find the teleflex fire pull handles were reversed at the instrument panel. Pulling the left handle would shut off the fuel to the right engine and vice versa...... Luckily this was discovered during a routine fuel filter replacement which required pulling the handle to stop the flow of fuel through that filter. We had operated the airplane for about 150 hours before the filter change. I still get nauseous relaying this story even after over 25 years.
 
Rigging trim tabs can easily be a Dyslexic Moment for some people since the aerodynamic function is the opposite that of the main surface.
Brings one of my instructors back at Embry Riddle back to mind, he frequently stated, "Do it like the book for once"
And here we have a case that the book should have been referenced.
 
A few years ago a test fight after paint on a 182 revealed the trim was backwards. The pilot was able to figure it out quickly with no disaster. Of course the trim system that moves the stabilizer is more forgiving than an anti servo tab going the wrong way.

Rich
 
I wrote a section in our company manual on picking an aircraft up from maintenance, and a separate section on conducting maintenance functional test flights. While I wouldn’t expect an individual operator to have a written procedure, the premise would be the same. We would sit in a conference room with the flight crew, maintenance lead from the facility and our company maintenance technician. We would review each item that was accomplished from the work order, and note if anything special was required particular to that item. For example if a flight control was removed, we would note that a functional check of that surface and a check mark from us was required prior to flight. For heavy maintenance the entire procedure could take the better part of a day. It would drive some of the facility management mad, but well worth it and ultimately helped protect them as well. People can and do screw up. I was always amazed to see a crew show up, jump in an airplane and depart from a maintenance facility with little more than a cursory walk-around. We came up with the need for this after we picked up an aircraft from a well known and respected facility only to find the teleflex fire pull handles were reversed at the instrument panel. Pulling the left handle would shut off the fuel to the right engine and vice versa...... Luckily this was discovered during a routine fuel filter replacement which required pulling the handle to stop the flow of fuel through that filter. We had operated the airplane for about 150 hours before the filter change. I still get nauseous relaying this story even after over 25 years.
Is there any chance of getting copies of both sections? I’m sure they would be good food for thought, whether picking up a Cub or a jet.
 
Is there any chance of getting copies of both sections? I’m sure they would be good food for thought, whether picking up a Cub or a jet.

I took early retirement a couple of years ago (too many years in management) and don’t have access to the manual anymore. I’ll take a look later to see if I have any of the files on my computer and will be happy to post them if I do. The larger section was on the maintenance test flight and while it was developed for larger aircraft the idea is the same. In my opinion, the main purpose is two fold: first and most important it changes your mindset. This is not just another flight, it is a maintenance test flight which is potentially high risk depending on what was accomplished. Second, it forces you to slow down, evaluate and plan. Just accomplishing those two things moves the odds in your favor.
 
No, you get what you pay for.

Not always true. My open checkbook has paid for things that were clearly not done, or done in a very shoddy manner. There are very few who I now trust to work on any of my "toys" from the plane to the off road to the boats. Even after I have paid those whom I "trust" I then "verify". I have seen some pretty sketchy stuff singed off that I would never let out the door of my shop on a childs tricycle let alone an airplane.
 
Here’s a good one if you think weird things can’t happen. Gulfstream 450 standard configuration has 2 engine fire bottles, one of which is available to the APU. There was also a mod that installed a third bottle dedicated to the APU. We did not have the mod, and went into a factory service center for inspection. Going through the paperwork before departure we see that they have signed off the inspection for the third bottle.... And next to the sign off was the inspectors stamp verifying it was done...... Lest you think I’m picking on mechanics (which I am not) I could fill a book with stupid pilot tricks, some allegedly committed by me!
 
After the third pass he might as well went and found a bridge to fly under:p Once is an accident. Three times you’re just pissing non aviation people off
 
I'm just blown away that it's a felony. Seems wrong to have such a stiff penalty and strip someone of their rights for life because the guy did a dumb thing.
 
I'm just blown away that it's a felony. Seems wrong to have such a stiff penalty and strip someone of their rights for life because the guy did a dumb thing.

Prosecutors strategy: Charge them with a statute that suggests life in prison, so you can negotiate down to a $50 fine. And big publicity for the (politically elected) prosecutor.

MTV
 
I'm just blown away that it's a felony. Seems wrong to have such a stiff penalty and strip someone of their rights for life because the guy did a dumb thing.

Yup and yikes. I just looked up the statute.

https://m.flsenate.gov/Statutes/860.13

"while intoxicated or in careless or reckless manner...."

So flying carelessly is the same penalty as flying drunk.

And the way they decide if it is careless?:

"In any prosecution charging careless or reckless operation of aircraft in violation of this section, the court, in determining whether the operation was careless or reckless, shall consider the standards for safe operation of aircraft as prescribed by federal statutes or regulations governing aeronautics."

That's a pretty big door. On the face of it, unsafe operation is a felony. As Mike says, it puts a lot of power in the hands of the local prosecutor.

Be careful in Florida.
 
I’ll wait for all the facts, but I’m trying to understand the mindset of a pilot to fly over a large concert with several thousand people multiple times and drop promotional objects.
 
I imagine being struck by a koosie at terminal velocity may be more than merely annoying to many, even to those of us within the aviation community.
 
Just for the record an empty koozie’s terminal velocity is likely that of a dry sock. Perhaps less depending on if it’s a tall sock.


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